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NOTES
REPLACEABLE PRoPnTY
(a) Where the property destroyed is freely and currently bought and
sold in the marketnmost jurisdictions agree that actual cash value is equiva-
lent to the market value at the timn of the loss." This necessarily presup-
poses the existence of an active, market with frequent trading in articles of
an identical character with that lost, a market in which the lost goods could
easily be replaced.1
A minority, holding that the actual cash value is deternmined by the cost
of replacement within a reaconable time,1 apparently confuses a limitation
upon recovery with the real measure of damages as stated above. In prac-
tically all the iases laying down this rule, the amount of recovery actually
was limited to the cost of repairs or replacement," such cost being less than
the market value. Such a result is. quite proper under the provisions of the
policy, but confusion ensues when the courts lay down a general principle
that "value is determined by the cost of replacement". Replacement cost
is not the determinant of the value of this type of property," although, as
shall subsequently be pointed out, .it may be important in establishing the
value of property which is not freely bought and sold on the market.
The only problem concerning the measure of damages in regard to
property of this class is to determine the market price, so that the sum
recovered by the insured will afford him indemnity for his loss, subject to
the limitation that recovery shall not exceed the cost of repair or replace-
ment.
(b) Although in many instances the lost or destroyed property can
be replaced within a reasonable time, there may be no well established and
ii. Western Massachusetts Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co., 12 Wall 201
(U S 18o) ; Fisher v. Crescent Insurance Co 33 Fed. 4 (C. C. W. D. N. C. z88
(whiskey); Georgia Cooperative Fire Association v. Lanier, i Ga. App. 86, 57 S.
910 (1907) (stock of store); Western Assurance Co. v. Studebaker Brog. Manufac-
turing Co., 124 Ind. 176, 23 N. E. z138 (irgo) (lumber) ; Farmers' Mercantile Co. v.
Farmers' Insurance Co., z61 Iowa 5. 141 N. W. 447. (s9x3) (stock of store); Erb v.
German-American Insurance Co., 98 Iowa 6o6, 67 N. V. 583 (x896) (drug stock);
Mitchell v. St. Paul Getman Fire Insurance Co., 92 Mich.594, 52 N. W. 1017 (:892)
(lumber); Leer v. Continental Insurance Co., 250 S. V. 631 (Kan. City Ct. App Mo
1923) (corn in crib) ; Gibson *. Glen Falls Insurance Co., it Neb. 827, 19"7N. W:
95o (zg2); Firemens Fufid Insurance Co. v. Rowland Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 269,
119 S. E. 362 (1923) (tobacco); Grubbs v. North Carolina Home Insurance Com-
pany, io8 N. C. 472 13 S. E. 236 (i89!) (stock of store); Fowler v. Old North State
£nsurance Co., 74 N. C. 89 (1876) (stock of store); Commonwealth Insurance Co. v.
Sennet, Barr & Co., 37 Pa. 2o5 (i86o) (mower and reaper); Stoops v. First American
Fire Insurance Co., 6o Tenn. 239. 22 S. W. (2d) io38 (i93o); Manchester Fire In-
surance Co. v. Simmons, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 607, 35 S. W. 722 (1896) (stock of store);
ci. Spivy-Johnson Portrait Co. v. Belt Automobile Indemnity Association. 21o Ala. 681,
99 So. go (1924); Federal Insurance Co. v. Hiter. 164 Ky. 743, 16 S. W. 210 (1915) ;
Ciresi v. Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., 187 Minn. 145, 244 N. W. 688 (1932) ;
Henderson v. Park Central Motors Service, 138 Misc. 183 244 N. Y. Supp. 409 (Sup.
Ct 1930).
12. McAnarney v. Newark Fire Insurance Co, 247 N. Y. 176, 159 N. E. 9g2
(1928).
1. Butler v. Security Insurance Corporation of New Haven, 244 IlL App. .79
(1927) (stock of store); Dummine Motor Co. v. Oregon Mutual Fire Insurance Co,
166 Ore. 69o. 114 P. (2d) oo5 (ig4i) ; Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 76
S. 'V. (2d) 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). But cf. Birminghamn Fire Insurance Co. v.
Pulver, x26 IlL 329, 18 N. E. 804 (1888). Compare Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Niagara
Fire Insurance Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 168, 87 S. W. 192 (19o5), with Virginia Fire
and Marine Insurance Co. v. Cannon, z8 Tex. Civ. App. 588 , 45 S. W. 945 (898).
14. See cases cited note ii supra.
I5. It should be noted that the replacement cost may be greater or less than, or
equal to the market value, depending upon the circumstances surrounding each particu-
lar case. See cases cited note ii jupr.
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active market for it, due to the nature of the property itself.1' In any event,
these goods have no market value indicative of their true value to the owner
or of his loss in being deprived of them.17 This is true of household fur-
niture and personal effects, whose measure of value is not the market value,
but rather the actual worth of the article to the owner, for use in the con-
dition in which it was at the time of the loss, "excluding any fanciful or
.sentimental consideration". 18 Suich a rule accomplishes little more than
laying down the test of "actual cash value", but what is meant is that the
measure of value will not be determined by the price for which the goods
are bought and sold in a dull secondhand market. While the value of per-
sonal effects and furniture cannot be allowed to be increased because of its
sentimental value to the owner, neither should it be subject to the odium of
secondhand goods. "Many such articles in daily use have no settled market
value subject to quotation. They may be of much greater intrinsic value
than the amoints they would sell for, and perhaps cannot be exactly dupli-
cated in the market. Greater latitude is therefore permitted in proving
their "actual cash calue"; 19 the character and quality of the goods, their
original cost, their condition at the time of destruction, and the state of the
market should all be considered.
20
Buildings also conic within this category, although some courts create a
distinction between the measure of damages applicable to buildings, which
are realty, and those applicable to personal property. "̂ This is probably the
result of their failure to recognize that different rules apply to different types
of personalty, so that buildings, though realty, fall within the rule regard-
ing personalty which is replaceable and yet has no free and current market
value. The tests laid down by the courts in ascertaining the measure of
damage for destruction of buildings are in accord with this contention. The
jury should consider "any fact reasonably tending to shed any light on
the question".22 The value of the property lost-the amount which would
indemnify the owner for his loss, is the amount to be recovered. 23 The cost
of replacement has frequently been applied as the measure of damages for
the destruction of realty,24 but this, again, is due to the confusion between a
16. "But market value does not in all cases afford a correct measure of indemnity
.in some cases there is no market value, properly speaking, and in others, if there
is. it clearly would not affard full indemnity." The court goes on to say that articles"in the plaintiff's possession, and used by her and kept for her use by her . . . [must
lie valued by their] vorth . . . to her for use in the condition in which they were
at the time of the fire, excluding any fanciful or sentimental considerations." Wall v.
Plait, 16) Mass. 398, 405. 48 N. E. 270. 273, 274 (1897).
17. Johnston v. Farniers' Fire Insurance Co., io6 Mich. 06, 64 N. W. 5 (1895).
i8. I.akc v. Dye. 232 N. Y. 2-0), 214, 133 N. E. 448 (1921); Joy v. Security Fire
Insurance Co., 83 Iowa 12, 48 N. W. 1049 (i89i); Sun Fire Office of London v.
Ayerst, .37 NOb. 184. 55 N. W. 635 (1893) ; Boyd v. Royal Insurance Co., iii N. C.
372. 16 S. E. .3,&) (1&)2) ; Chicago Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Harkness, 58 S. W.
(2d) 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1033) ; Osborne v. Phenix Insurance Co.. 23 Utah 428, 64
Pac. 1103 (1oo0). Compare the measure of damages for conversion in Souther v.
1Hut. 14T S. W. 359. 361 (Tex. Civ. App. igix).
19. Johnston v. Farmers' Fire Insurance Co., io6 Mfich. 96, xoo, 64 N. IV. 5, 6
(1895).
20. See cases cited note 18 mupra.
2r. State In.surance Co. of Des Moines v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 333 (I&Po);
Boise Associatiou of Credit .en v. U. S. Fire Insurance Co., 44 Idaho 249, 256 Pac.
5"3 (1927).
22. Sebrlng v. Firemen's Insurance Co. of Newark, 227 App. Div. 1o3, 104, 237
N. Y. Sujip. 120, 122 (4th Dept 192).
23. See note 2 Mrpra.
24. This provision is more apt to limit recovery in the case of buildings, and hence
[he courtc, not too clearly seeing the problem, have been prone to adopt it as the test
for measuring damages.
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limitation upon recovery and the real measure of damages. The purpose
of the replacement provision is to protect the insurer from appreciation of
values not caused by increased costs of construction; it is not the measure,
but recovery is limited thereby.2 The true measure of damages is the actual
worth to the owner for use in the condition at the time of the loss, excluding
of course, sentimental considerations. Original cost, amount of use, depre-
ciation, amount necessary for replacement or repair, and other pertinent
facts should all be considered in determining the pecuniary loss of the
insured.:,
Certain goods are replaceable within a reasonable time and yet cannot
be bought and sold in the market at all, as was the case in Travelers Iu-
dcinity Co. v. Plymouth Box and Panel Co," where a turbine was de-
stroyed. Evidence as to original cost, cost of replacement, net income from
productive property, depreciation, and testimony of experts was all held
to be properly introduced and submitted to the jury. A wide range of in-




(a) Where repair or replacement within a reasonable time is impos-
sible, the simple cost of reproduction is not sufficient to indemnify the
insured. The actual cash value must be determined, but how? Once more,
the cases fall into two Categories, depending upon whether the property
is bought and sold in the market, or whether there is no market.
25. Citizens' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
86 Vt. 267, 84 Atl. 97o (1912), aff'd, 87 Vt. 23, 86 At. ioS6 (1913).
26. National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v. School District No. 68, Sequoyah
County, Okla., i S F. (2d) 232 (C.'C. A. ioth, 194o) ; Rutherford v.. Royal Insurance
Co., 12 F. (2d) 88o (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Prussian National Insurance Co. v. Law-
rence, 22i Fed. 93z (C..C. A. 4th, i915) ; Providence Washington Insurance Co. v.
Gulinson, 73 Colo. 282, 215 Pac. 154 (1923); State Insurance Co. of Des Moines v.
Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 333 (i8go) ; Boise Association of Credit Men v. United
States Fire Insurance Co, 44 Idaho 249, 256 Pac. 523 (1927) Aetna Insurance Co.
v. Johnson, ii Bush 587 (Ky. 1874); Stenzel v. Penna. Fire Insurance Co., zio La.
1019, 35 So. 271 (1903) ; Hilton v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of London, 92 Me. 272, 42
Ati. 412 (1898) ; Washington Mills Emery Manufacturing Co. v. Veymouth & Brain-
tree Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 135 Mass. 503 r883) ; McAnarney v. Newark Fire
Insurance Co., 247 N. Y. 176, i59 N. E. 902 (1928); Sebring v. Firemen's Insurance
Co. of Newark '227 App. Div. I03, 237 N. Y. Supp. 120 (4th Dep t 1929) ; McCready
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 61 App. Div. 583, 70 N. Y. Supp. 778 (ist Dep't
i9o) ; Patriotic Order Sons of America Hall Association v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., 305 Pa. 107, 157 At. 259 (1931); Burkett v. Georgia Home Insurance C., 1o
Tenn. 548, S8. S. W. 848 (igoo) ; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Murray, i5o
S. W. 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Citizens' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Fitchburg
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 86-Vt. 267, 84 At. 970 (1912) ; Vanderburgh v. Oneida
Farmers' Mutual' Insurance Co., [i935 D. L. R. 257 (Ontario); Jackson v. Canada
Accident & Fire Assurance Co, 52 N. B. R. 33 (1924); Canadian National Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Colousay Hotel Co, [1923] 3 D. L. R. iooi; cf. Standard Sewing Machine
Co. v,. Royal Insurance Co. of Liverpool, 2o Pa. 64-, 51 AtL 354 (1902) ; Shipley v.
American Central Insurance Co., 21 Tenn. App. 259, 109 S. W. (2d) 100 (1937); Men-
dez v. North British and Mercantile Insurance Co., 5 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 263 09o9).
For the measure of damages recoverable when growing crops ari destroyed, see Mc-
Ilrath v. Famers' Mutual Hail Insurance Association of Iowa, 114 Iowa 244, 86 N. NV.
310 (19oi); Rohlik v. Farmers' Insurance Co., 49 N. D. 235, 191 N. W. 347 (1922);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 25 Okla. 76o, 107 Pac. 662 (1910).
27. 99 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 4th. 1938). See also Home Insurance Co. v. Sulli-
van Machinery Co., 64 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933) ; Security Printing Co. v.
Conn. Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford, 2o9 Mo. App. 422, 240 S. W. 263 (1922) ; Gulf
Compress Co. v. Insurance Company of Penna., 129 Tenn. 586, 167 S. W. 859 (1914).
Cf. trover damages in" Ruppel v. Adrian Furniture Mfg. Co., 96 Mich. 455, 55 N. W.
995 (0893).
28. Milwaukee Trust Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 15I Wis. 224, r38 N. IV. 707
(912).
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In Mechanics' Insurance Co. of Phila. v. Hoover Distilling Co.," a
large quantity of "Hoover whiskey' stored in a bonded warehouse was
destroyed by fire. The defendant asked the court to charge the jury that
plaintiff could recover the actual cash value, not exceeding cost of replac-
ing it with material of like kind and quality. This was refused, and the
court charged that if "Hoover whiskey" had a market, and by reason of its
brand and reputation could not be replaced by whiskey of like quality, the
replacement clause was no defense, and the jury was to consider the other
clause alone. Under these instructions a verdict was returned based on the
market price of the whiskey. This was held not erroneous, the Circuit
Court of Appeals saying:
"The court, therefore, could not have lawfully limited the plain-
tiff's recovery to the cost of the manufacture of the whiskey.... Its
value had been enhanced beyond its cost. ... Much time had been
required to make it and much to age it. Under circumstances of this
nature, the manufacturer is not limited to a recovery of the amount it
would cost him to make and age a like product, because that would
not be the actual cash value of the product destroyed.""
Similarly, when a fire destroyed a factory used for the manufacture of
straw hats, together with its contents, it was established that insured could
not obtain hats from any other source or have his factory rebuilt within a
reasonable time. The Court of Appeals of New York held it was impossible
to apply the replacement clause of the contract, and determined the amount
of recovery by the price at which the hats were contracted to be sold.'1
Thus, although property may be irreplaceable, it still can have an estab-
lished market value. Where that is true, the courts allow a recovery based
on the market value and entirely disregard the clause limiting liability to the
cost of repair or replacement."2
(b) Finally, some property, once destroyed, is absolutely irreplaceable.
A rare painting, the only one of its kind, can never be replaced. Fortu-
nately, practically all such property is insured under a valued policy, and
the courts have not often been presented with the problem of interpreting
the "actual cash value" clause in this situation. However, when the insured
has not taken this precaution, the courts have had to find some measure of
value on which to base an award of damages. Obviously, the fact that
property is without market value does not mean it is valueless."2
In Chicago Bonding and Insurance Co. v. Oliner,s, decided in 1921,
plaintiff's choice liquor was stolen and due to prohibition was not replace-
able. The court held that the cost price was as close to the actual cash
value as such value was capable of estimation.
"Conditions regulating the traffic in liquors were comparatively
a new thing at that time, but the courts must take cognizance of the
conditions as they then prevailed, and as exact evidence of the value
-9. i82 Fed. -; (C. C. A. 8th, xgio).
30. Id. at 597.
31. Phillips v. Home Insurance Ca., 128 App. Div. 528, 112 N. Y. Supp. 769 (Ist
Dep't 1908).
32. See also Frick v. United Firemen's Insurance Co., 218 Pa. 409, 67 Atl. 743
(1907) ; Virginia Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. .annon, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 588, 45
S. W. 94s (188).
33. Chicago Bonding and Insurance Co. v. Oliner, 139 Md. 408, 115 Att. 592
(192i) ; IHayward v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. of London, 214 Mo. App.
101, 257 S. W. 1083 (19z4).
34- 139 Md. 408, 115 At. 592 (i921).
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at the time of the burglary or theft was not available, the cost of the
same would afford some ground, sufficient to base a verdict on, in esti-
mating the loss.""
This rule 3 ' appears to be an unsatisfactory solution. The goods are
irreplaceable, and there is no etablished market value. Original cost may
often be unjust. Suppose that the plaintiff in the Oliner case had purchased
the liquor at an extremely low price as compared to its market value at the
time of the purchase. Should he be limited in his recovery because he made
a good bargain in his purchase? It would seem more fair if all the factors
relating to the value of the destroyed property were taken into considera-
tion, as in the case of replaceable goods having no established market value.
EFFEcT OF RATIONING, PRIORITY CONTROL AND PRIcE CEILINGS
The allocation of scarce materials by means of. priorities, preference
ratings, and material allocations, together with the fixing of ceiling prices
for many everyday commodities 37 means that much formerly "replaceable"
property has now become "irreplaceable". Sewing machines, automobiles,
tires, refrigerators, and numerous other articles, if destroyed, may not be
replaceable. "with material of like kind and quality within a reasonable
time." There are several possible courses which the courts may follow in
estimating damages in this situation. Let us examine the possibilities.
The rules regarding the measure of damages for the various kinds of
property may be applied exactly as before, entirely disregarding the practi-
cal effects of these wartime regulations. Ii support of such a rule, it is.
argued that the measure of liability is governed by the terms of the con-
tract; that the proper method-of determining the amount of recovery has
been fixed by judicial decision, depending upon the type, of property in
question; therefore, that the problem is already settled and no change from
the status quo should be made. The damages within the contemplation of
the parties were for a certain type of property." and that measure of dam-
ages-cannot subsequently be increased without imposing on the parties a
new contract. However, this argument forgets that indemnity is the basis
of all insurance law."' The amount of recovery is based on the actual cash
value at the time of loss, and that such value may increase before the risk
insured against occurs is within the contemplation of the parties," whether
the increase is due to scarcity of the property destroyed or increased costs
of -production.
A second possible theory on which to base damages is that property
subject to rationing and priority regulation shifts to the proper.class of irre-
placeable property, and the measure of damages applicable to that'dass is
the basis of recovery. This provides that unrationed and unallocated goods
and materials would remain in their present class of property with the pres.
3;8. i39 1d. 408, 412, is Atil. 592, 593 (1921).
36. In addition- to cases cited in note 33 supra, see also Murphy v. St. Joseph
Transfer Co., 235 S. W. 138 (Kan. City Ct. App,. Mo. 1921).
37. Note (1942) 51 YAL L J. zz96 et seq.
38. The standard policy perhaps should be changed to include a provision limiting
liability in case the type of property insured changes from "replacable" to "irreplac-
able", for the "cost of repair or replacement" limitation is inapplicable in the eent of
such a change.
39. See note 2 SUpra.
4. Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Co. v. McFadden, 17o Fed. 179
(C. C. A. 3d. ivog), cert. den d, 215 U. S. 604 09o9) ; Providence Vashington Insur-
ance Co. v. Gulinson, 73 Colo. 282, 215 Pac. x5 (1923).
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ent rule for measuring damages. For instance, such goods as electric
refrigerators and sewing machines are no longer manufactured, but there is
still a definite market for them, and they are obtainable to a certain extent.
Yet they are irreplaceable, for there are just so many of them in existence,
and when one is destroyed no new machine comes into existence to replace
it. This type of property would fall within the first class of "frreplace-
ables," and the basis for determining the actual cash value would be the
price at which such goods are selling in the market, with no limitation
imposed by cost of replacement."1 Other commodities, such as tires and
building materials, may be absolutely impossible to replace due to rationing
anti priority regulations.' 2 They would, under this theory, fall within the
second class of "irreplaceables"."3 But the few cases decided thereunder
indicate that cost price is the proper basis for determining damages. It
seems obvious that original cost will be inadequate, under present condi-
tions, to afford indemnity to the insured. Of course, in dealing with any
irreplaceable goods, money damages are at best inadequate to make the loss
whole-nothing can do that, but a more equitable result than that reached
undcr the present decisions is desirable and possible.A third solution is the creation of a new and general class of property,
that subject to rationing and priority regulation. This would be a tempo-
rary class, leaving undisturbed the four classes which have developed during
normal times. It would bave to be an "emergency" type of property, and
recognized as such. The application of either of the two theories previously
advanced is attended with certain practical difficulties, but either of them
offers a considerable amount of certainty as to the amount of damages re-
coverable. Under the third theory, the courts would be treading on virgin
soil. Damages could be measured by the application of a rule or rules
analogous to those already existing. Or an analogy could be drawn to tort
damages for conversion.4 ' The court could set as the measure of "actual
cash value" the ceiling price as determined under the Price Control Act.
5
But the price of goods in the "bootleg" market could not be used as a meas-




It is doubtful in the extreme whether the parties to an insurance con-
tract entered into prior to the war ever had wartime conditions in contem-
plation. They may have anticipated some increase in value,"4 but certainly
did not consider the possibility of the insured property becoming irreplace-
able. Nonetheless, it is generally conceded that in event of war all contracts
of insurance should be left intact except for certain exceptions unrelated to
this discussion.48 The underlying theory is that public interest overrules
private interests to the extent of these exceptions. but that private interests
41. See page 64 supra.
42. 'Note (1042) 51 YALF L. .. i196.
43. See page 64 supra.
44. See MacGregor v. Watts. 254 App. Div. 9o4, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 525 (2d Dep't
io3 ) (manuscripts converted); Furlan v. Rayon Photo Works, 171 Misc. 839, 12 N.
Y. S. (2d) o2 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1939). See also Green v. Boston and Lowell R. R.,
128 .Mass. 221 (18,o).
45- f 7042) o l.Aw & CONTEMP. PROB. 22, The Emnergency Price Control Act.
46. lla%\ard v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. of London, 214 Mo. App.
101, 1,x. 237 S. W. 1083, 1o85 (1924). "There was but one market . . . the other
so-called market is one resting in crime and is unlawful and is not to be considered as
a basis of recovery. When we speak of value, we imply a transaction in the open,
lauful market." Cf. Chicago Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Oliner, 139 Md. 408, i15 Att.
5,2 (1921 . That such markets now actually exist, see T1MNF, May 4, 1942, p. 73.
47. See note 40 sutprO.
4.S. I MAv, IxsUR.xc E. (4 th ed. itoo) §42A.
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should be interfered with no further than is necessary for the public pur-
pose.4" Following this theory, the contract of insurance will not be held
to be avoided or suspended due to war. One limitation is imposed, how-
ever. Public interest has necessitated the fixation of ceiling prices for prac-
tically, all commodities, and that same public interest r.,quires that recovery
under an insurance policy be no higher than the ceiling price for the com-
modity-in question,"0 under'any test for the measure of damages which may
be adopted. Since, in most cases, -the actual cash value of the insured prop-
erty will not be less than the ceiling price, such price will, in effect, be the
measure of dainages. However, the ceiling price should not be conclusive
because it is conceivable that the actual cash value of some insured property
may fall below this standard.
The problem, then, is to afford as much protection to the insured for
his irreplaceable loss as is consistent with the 'ublic interest and the wel-
fare of the insurer, keeping a desirable amount of certainty as to the meas-
ure of recovery and yet allowing for changing conditions. The creatioti
of a class of property to be considered apart from the four regular classes
previously discussed would accomplish* this purpose to tbe greatest degree.
War is a temporary and abnormal condition, and the recognition of this is
paramount in formulating the policy to be followed. The creation of this
new type of "irreplaceables" would avoid confusion between the problems
existing in wartime and in peace time. Rather than attempt to constantly
shift property from "replaceable" to "irreplaceable", let us. recognize that
these are strange and new conditions. They must be met and conquered
through the experience of the past, looking toward the welfare of the
future. The courts must take all factors into consideration-public policy
as. evidenced by cei!ing prices,-the impossibility of replacement, the extent
and importance of the loss to the insured, the rules laid down in the past as
to the measure of damages, and the possible effects of the adoption of a new
measure of damages.
CONCLUSION
Amidst a labyrinth of confused and conflicting decisions defining "ac-
tual cash value","' one particular stands out above all else. Perhaps un-
knowingly, perhaps with but a vague realization of what they were actually
accomplishing, the courts have interpreted this phase in four different ways,
depending upon the nature of the property destroyed. If the article is re-
placeable within a reasonable time and is freely and currently bought and
sold in the market, the market price is the actual cash value, with recovery
limited by the cost of replacement. If the article is replaceable within a
reasonable time and there is no free and active market, the jury is instructed
to consider all factors in arriving at a verdict., with recovery again limited
to the cost of replacement. Where the article destroyed is irreplaceable
and yet has a market, the measure of damages is that market price, without
any limitation. Where the article is absolutely irreplaceable, cost price has
been held the basis of recovery, although this result is questionable.
49. Ibid.
So. See Note (1942) 55 HAV. L. REV. 477, 484, 485. Compare the cases there
cited in notes 342, 343 and 344, with Globe & Rutgers Insurance Co. v. Prairie Oil &
Gas Co., 248 Fed. 452 (C. C. A. 2d, i917) (where the price for oil as fixed by the
Oklahoma State Corporation Commission was the measure of recovery for the destruc-
tion of oil).
Sz. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U. S. 689, 699
(1933). "Value for exchange is not the only val-ue known to the law of damages.
There are times when heed must be given to value for use if reparation is to be ade-
quate.'
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The effect of war upon these measures of value cannqt yet be ascer-
tained. No definite rule can be - advanced. Rather than attempt to con-
stantry shift property about within the existing classes and adopt the
measures of damages appropriate to each class, it is urged that a new type
of "wartime irreplaceables" be created, and a measure of damages be arrived
at from a consideration of all the conditions and factors invofved-to last
"for the duration".
C. M. K.
Damages for Wrongful Death in Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has two statutes permitting recovery for wrongful death.1
One of them, modeled on the famous Lord Campbell's Act,2 and commonly
referred to as the death statute, gives to the widow, husband, parents, and
children of the deceased a remedy against the tort-feasor whereby each may
recover the loss he has suffered because of the death.* The other, section
3 5(b) of the Fiduciaries Act, is known as the survival statute, for by its
terms all personal actions which might have been brought by the deceased
with the exceptions of libel and slander, survive to the personal representa-
tive of the deceased who may pursue the actions for the benefit of the
estate.' The purpose of the legislature in enacting the death statute was to
compensate injuries which the common law ignored and to prevent a tort-
feasor from escaping liability because of the very gravity of his tort; 5 the
purpose of the survival statute was to allow damages for injuries which were
I. See Meyer, A New Death Act (1939) 43 Drcx. L. Rav. 83; Notes (1939) 14
TEmp. L. Q. InI, (1936) I U. op Pirr. L. REv. 66% for a general discussion of the
death statutes in Pennsylvania.
2. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
3. Act of April ix, i85z, P. L 669, § i9, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93!) tit. 12,
V "Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and
no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the
widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives
may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned."
Adt of April 1, 1937i P. L I96, § r, PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, Supp. 194o) tit. x1,
§ 6o2 which amended the Act of April 26, 185, P. L. 309, § x, and the Act of June 7,
1911, P. L. 678, § i:
'The persons entitled to recover damages for any injuries causing death shall
be the husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased, and no other relatives
. . . and the sum recovered shall go to them in the proportion they would take
his or her personal estate in case of intestacy, and that without liability to cred-
itors. . . . U none of the above relatives are left to survive the decedent, then
the personal representative shall be entitled to recover damages for reasonable
hospital, nursing, medical, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration neces-
sitated by reason of injuries causing death."
4. Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, §35 (b), as amended July 2, 1937, P. L 2755,
§2, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. i94o) tit. 20, §772:
"'Executors or administrators shall have the power, either alone or jointly with
other plaintiffs, to commence and prosecute all actions for mesne profits or for tres-
pass to real property, and all personal actions which the decedent whom they rep-
resent might have commenced and prosecuted, except actions for slander and for
libels ....
This statute was declared unconstitutional in 1923 because of a defective title. Strain
v. Kern, 277 Pa. 2o9, i2o Atd. 818 (1923). The defect was cured in the 1937 re-enact-
ment.
It should be noted that the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447. § 35 (a), as amended
by the Act of March 3o, 1921, P. L. s5, § i, PA. SrAT. AN,x. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit.
2o. § 771, providing that the personal representative may continue actions brought by
the decedent during his life, is also a part of the survival statute.
5. At common law there was no remedy for wrongful death. See RrSTATE1ENT,
TORTS (:939) § 925, comment a, for a concise statement of the development of death
statutes.
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not compensated under the death statute.' In relieving these injuries, the
survival statute apparently permits recovery of some items of damage which
are also recoverable under the death statute. If each of the statutcs creates
a separate cause of action, the tort-feasor must apparently pay the same
item of damage to two different plaintiffs, once under the death statute,
and once under the survival statute.
That the statutes do create separate and distinct causes of action, not
merely'alternative remedies, has been generally agreed.' Therefore, recovery
under one statute does not bar recovery under the other,' and the tort-feasor
may be forced to bear a double burden.
A hypothetical case will illustrate the problem. Suppose the defendant
injures a husband who subsequently dies as a result of the injury leaving a
widow surviving him.' The widow can seek -her remedy under the death
statute, or, since she is usually the personal representative of the deceased
husband, she may bring an action under the survival statute, or she may do
both 10  What, then, are the items of damage which she may recover?
ITEMS OF DAMAGES UNDER THE DEATu STATUTE
Since the enactment of the death statute in i851, a substantial number
of opinions construing the statute have been reported and it is well settled
that the widow, as one of the relatives favored by the death statute, can
recover to the extent that she has been injured by the death. 1 In many
cases, the courts have been particularly concerned with the measure of
damages, though their problem has not been complicated, until very recently,
by the calculation of damages under the survival statute. In Penia. R. R.
6. The death statute made no allowance for recovery by others than the named
relatives. Even brothers and sisters of the deceased, no .matter how. dependent upon
the deceased, could not recover. Eifler v. Anderson, z22 Pa. Super. .47, 186 Atl. 323
(1936).
7. Voelkel v. Bennett, iiS F. (2d) i02 (C. C. A. 3d, '940) ; Kriesak Y. Crowe, 36
F. Su p. 127 (K. D. Pa. i94o); Gray v. Tribune Printing Co., 42 Pa. D. & C. o7
(i94r); Glaesser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D. & C. 68 (1939) ; Findeisen v. Friedman, 35 Pa.
D. & C. 523 (z939) ; Gannon v. Lawler 34 Pa. D. & C.571 0939 -);see PezzuUi V.
D'Ambrosia, 26 A. (2d) 659 (Pa. Sup. (t. 1942); Lutge Y. Rosin, 32 Pa. D. & C. 3
& (4SeGan v. Lawler, 4 Pa. D. & C. , 76-5 . ...
9. This was the situation in the case of Cannop v. awler, 34 Pa. D. & C. VT
(5939). Subsequent cases in the lower courts were greatly influenced by the reasoning
in this case, though the death of a minor rather than a spouse was involved. E.g,
Voelkel v. Bennett, x5 F. (2d) o2 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o); Glaesser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D.
& C. 68 (1939).
so. While many actions have been brought under the death statute, only two cases
which consider the question of damages have been brought under the survival statute
alone. Kriesak i. Crowe, 36 F. Supp. z27h(M. D. Pa. 594o); Lutge v. Rosin, 32 Pa.
D. & C. 338 (z938). Since 1938 six cases have been'litigated in which causes of action
under both statutes have been joined. Voelkel v. Bennett, zi5 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A.
3d, i94o); Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 26 A. (2d) 6%9 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1942); Gray v.
Tribune Printing Co, 42 Pa. D. & C. io7 (194z); Glaesser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D. & C.
68 (1939); Findeisen v. Friedman, 35 Pa. D. & C. 523 (1939); Gannoir v. Lawler,
Pa. D. & C. 571 (1939). Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Citil Procedure (1939.),
actions under both statutes, if brought within six months after the death, must be
brought in the name of the personal representative. Rule 22oz says that the personal
representative will sue and collect damages for those persons entitled to the benefits of
the death statute. A notation following the Rule states that the Rule is not intended
to affect the operation of the survival statute. It appears, therefore, that the causes
of action remain separate and that the issue of damages will not b directly affected by
the Rule.
ii. A child or a parent may also recover to the extent that he is injured. Minldn
v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. (2d) 46! (1939); Glaesser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D. & C. 68
(1939).
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v. Bittlcr, 12 Mr. Justice Sharswood suggested a measuring rod which has
since received the enthusiasic approval of the Pennsylvania courts:
".... the proper measure of damages is the pecuniary loss suffered
by the parties entitled to the sum to be recovered .. and that loss is
what the deceased would have probably earned by his intellectual or
bodily labor in his business or profession during the residue of his life-
time, and which would have gone for the benefit of his children, [or
widow] taking into consideration his age, ability and disposition to
labor, and his habits of living and expenditure.""
In addition to recovering her share in the prospective earnings of the
deceased, the widow may now recover, by virtue of an amendment to the
death statute,14 certain expenses incurred because of the injurY" and death.
Whatever she recovers, however, must be compensation for a "pecuniary"
loss,"5 and it has been emphasized that she recovers because she herself
has been injured, not because of any injury to the deceased.
ITEMS OF DAMAGE LTNDER THE SURVIVAL STATUTE
.According to the terms of the recently re-enacted survival statute, sec-
tion 3 5 (b) of the Fiduciaries Act,
6 the personal representative of the de-
ceased has the power to pursue any personal cause of action that the
deceased could have pursued except an action for defamation. Therefore,
in order to determine what damages the personal representative can re-
cover, it must first be determined what damages the deceased could have
recovered had he lived.
Probably the deceased suffered pain and inconvenience as a result of
the personal injuries which caused his death; he may have suffered perma-
nent injuries such as the loss of a limb; he may have incurred medical
expenses; his working efficiency may have been impaired, with consequent
decrease in earnings either temporarily or permanently. For all these, the
deceased could have recovered from the defendant, and, according to the
words of the survival statute, the personal representative can recover the
same damages for the benefit of the estate. Since the widow could not
recover for any of these items, no problem of overlapping damages is pres-
ent by them, but as to other items, the damages recoverable under the
two statutes appear to overlap."
OVERLAPPING DAMAGES
Apparently both statutes allow the recovery of prospective earnings.
The widow's right to recover on her own account is limited to the amount
12. 57 Pa. 335 (1868).
13. Id. at 338.
14 Act of May 13, r927, P. L. 992, § r, PA. STAT. A-w. (Purdort, 1931) tit. 12,
§16o4: "Whenever any person or persons, who are authorized by law so to do, shall
bring an action to recover damages for a death caused by unlawful violence or neg-
ligence of the defendant, the plaintiff may recover, in addition to the damages now
recoverable in such actions, the expenses incurred for medical and surgical care
and for nur.ing of the deceased, and such other expenses caused by the injury
which resulted in death as could have been recovered in an action begun by the
injured person in his lifetime; and plaintiff may also recover the reasonable funeral
expenses of the deceased, if plaintiff has paid or incurred such expenses."
15. Walker v. E. A. Strout Realty Agency, ii Pa. Super. x6g, 175 Atl. 259
(xo34) ; Gavdos v. Donmabyl, 30! Pa. 523, 152 Ati. 549 (i93o) ; Pa. R. R. v. Zebe, 33
Pa. 318 (1858). See also Note (z936) i U. or Prrr. L. Rmv. 167, 173.
16. See note 4 supra.
17. Glae.ser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D. & C. 68 (1939); Gannon v. Lawler, 34 Pa. D. &
C. 571 (1939): .see Voelkel v. Bennett, iiS F. (2d) 1o2, io4 (C. C. A. 3d, i94o).
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of the prospective earnings which would have been used for her benefit if
the death had not occurred,1 I but the right of the personal representative
is limited only to the amount which could have been recovered by the
deceased.2' The measure of damages for a personal injury generally in-
cludes the difference between the normal earning capacity and the earning
capacity of the man in his injilred state for the duration of the impairment
of earning capacity.20 The deceased could have recovered this amount
before his death. In the case of aL permanent disability such as the loss of
a limb, the injured man could recover his probable loss of earnings over the
rest of his life.21 In case of total incapacity due to the injury, his recovery
would include the whole of his prospective earnings. Since many injuries
which eventually cause death also cause total incapacity to labor, the loss
of earnings to the deceased often equals the total prospective earnings over
the life expectancy of the deceased. If the total prospective earnings of the
deceased are recoverable by the personal representative, and if the widow
can also recover a portion of those earnings,* the respective recoveries
overlap.
This problem has arisen in several cases, but only recently reached
a Pennsylvania appellate tribunal." In most of the cases, the relatives
suing under the death statute and the personal representatives suing under
the survival statute joined their respective causes of action. In their opin-
ioris the loiver courts carefully refrained from violating the well-settled
rule of damages under the death statute and proceeded to construe damages
under the survival statute in such a way as to prevent the double recovery
of earnings. In so doing, they were forced to find that the cause of action
created by the survival statute was different from the cause of action that
the deceased would have had if he had lived, and that the measure of dam-
ages under the survival statute was not the same as it would have beep
in the deceased's cause of action.2 ' The reason for this differentiation was
that no cause of action existed under the death statute if the deceased had
brought a suit for damages during his life,2' and the danger of overlapping
damages was therefore eliminated. After distinguishing the causes of action
the lower courts prevented duplicate damages by laying down a rule of
thumb, namely, that the personal representative suing under the survival
statute should recover the deceased s loss of earnings during the period
between the injury and the death, but not What he might have earned had
he lived out his natural span of life.26
The rule of thumb has proved expedient where, as in the usual situa-
tion, actions under both statutes have been ritigated together, and it could
also be applied where a judgment has been entered under the death ,statute.
18. Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 32z Pa. 438, 184 At. 663 (936); Pilipovidh v.
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 314 Pa. 585, 172 Ad. z36 (1934).
xg. See Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 26 A. (2d) 659 (Pa. Sup. Ct. i942); Lutge v.
Rosin, 32 Pa. D. & C. 338, 348 (1938).
20. Scott Twp. v. Montgomery, 95 Pa. 444 (i88o) ; McLaughlin v. City of Corry,
77 Pa. io9 (1874) ; 4 SUTEIiLAND, DA.'rAGES (4th ed. i916) § 1251.
21. 4 SUTHRIAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) § 125T.
22. Sce Pezzuili v. D'Ambrosia, 26 A. (2d) 659 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2942).
23. See Gannon v. Lawler, 34 Pa. D. & C. 57r, 577 (939). But see Lutge Y.
Rosin, 32 Pa. D. & C. 338, 344 (1938).
-if decedent brought suit but died before its conclusion. his personal representative
may coptinue the action under the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, § 35 (a), as amended
by the Act of March 3o, i922, P. L 5, § 1, PA. SrAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. i94O) tit.
20, § 771.
24. This is expressly provided by the death statute. See note 3 supra.
25. Glaesser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D. & C. 68, 73 (z939). Other cases cted note 3
.tupra.
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The rule of thumb may be unsatisfactory, however, in some situations. For
example, where none of the survivors can sue under the death statute,24
the prospective earnings of the deceased are a total loss to the beneficiaries
of the estate, and no remedy is available to them. Inasmuch as the benefi-
ciaries of the estate may include close relatives and creditors,21 both of
whom may have sustained substantial injury from the death, the rule of
thumb prejudices the interests of the innocent injured persons in favor of
the interests of the tort-feasor.
A somewhat similar situation occurs in the case of a child who is in-
jured and dies of the injury while still a minor.2 ' The parents may recover
the loss of services and the loss of earnings up to the time the child would
have been twenty-one sears old, but not beyond that age, because they then
have no claim to his earnings. Unless the personal representative under
the survival statute caii recover the loss of the child's prospective earni.1gs
from the age of twenty-one to the limit of his normal life expectancy, neither
the estate nor the relatives have a remedy.
Even where the survivors are able to bring suit under the survival
statute and thereby be compensated in full for their own pecuniary loss, it
is evident that if the personal representative is unable to recover prospec-
tive earnings from the time of death, the tort-feasor is paying less than
he would have paid if the decedent had lived. The prospective earnings
recovered under the death statute are clearly not equal to all the prospec-
tive earnings of the deceased, yet the tort-feasor would have been liable for
this amount if he had been sued during the life of the deceased. It seems
eminently unfair to thus allow the wrong-doer to profit by the death of his
victim.
As to the award of damages for expenses incurred because of the death,
a problem arises which is similar to the problem of prospective earnings.
According to their terms, both the death statute and the survival statute
permit recovery of certain expenses incident to the injury and death of the
deceased which the deceased himself could have recovered if he had lived.
2
9
The same courts that were concerned with damages for loss of prospective
earnings also dealt with this problem and found it easier to solve. Rely-
ing on the fact that only one person was primarily liable for expenses
incurred, the courts allowed the personal representative to recover only
where the estate had paid the expenses or was primarily liable for thlm,
and allowed the widow to recover only where she had paid or was
primarily liable 30 This seems the fairest possible distribution of damages
for expenses incurred since it successfully prevents overlapping recoveries,
even though it does not necessarily obey the letter of either statute.
26. Where no widow, child, or parent of the deceased survive him, the death
statute is not available to other close kin. Eifler v. Anderson, 122 Pa. Super. 547, 186
At. 323 (1936).
27. Creditors are expressly excluded from sharing in any sum recovered under the
death statute. See note 3 supra.
28. This was the situation in Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 3d,
194o), and in Glaesser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D. & C. 68 (1939). In the latter case, the
court- evidently thought it more important to avoid double damages than to compensate
for the loss of the child's prospective earnings after he became an adult. In the former
case, the court found it unnecessary to decide the point, for the jury estimated the
probable net accumulations after majority at zero.
-9. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
3o. Gannon v. Lawler, 34 Pa. D. & C. _7;. 579 (939). The recent decision of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 26 A. (2d) 659 (Pa. Sup.




The Pennsylvania courts have several courses which they may follow
ii interpreting the survival statute. Some have already been followed,
others merely suggested.
First, it is possible to argue that an action under the death statute bars
an action under the *survival statute, a:;d vice versa. The premise for
this argument is that both actions are derived from the deceased; and that
since the deceased could have brought but one action, only one action can
be derived from him. There is no authority in Pennsylvania for this
position.$' Moreover, it was not the intent of the legislature to create alter-
native remedies, and it has been decided that the remedies given by the stat-
utes are cumulative. 3 It is probable that the courts will continue to con-
strue the statutes as two separate causes of action.
Second, assuming there is a separate cause of action under each stat-
ute, the courts may follow the letter of the statutes. Necessarily, this would
lead to overlapping damages, and the tort-feasor would be forced to pay
some items of damage twice. This is not a desirable result, for it is a well-
known principle of English and American law that, except as punishment,
no one shall be made to pay twice for one fault. There is patently no
punitive purpose in either of the vrongful death statutes in Pennsylvania,"
and whatever overlapping damages there may be are due to the inadvertence
and not the intent of the legislature. It-therefore seems undesirable to fol-
low the letter of the statutes, and until legislative action has been taken
the courts will probably construe them to avoid double damages.
Third, the'interpretation of the survival statute may be varied to fit the
situation before the court. This was successfully done in Kriesak v.
Crowe" where the personal representative was allowed to recover prospec-
tive earnings for the normal life expectancy of deceased since there were
no relatives eligible to sue under the death statute and hence no possibility
of overlapping recoveries. While this method may achieve a satisfactory
result, its use is questionable because of the necessary inconsistency of
interpretation involved.
Fourth, the courts may allow the personal representatives to recover
only for losses sustained between the time of the accident and the death.
This rule of thumb has been generally adopted by the lower courts but, as
we have previously stated," it fails to provide for all contingencies and
often is a concession to tort-feasors in contravention of the interests of
innocent parties. Since the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Pezzulli v. D'IAnbrosia 36 it is doubtful if these prior adjudications will be
of any weight.
Fifth, a compromise suggested by Judge Goodrich in Voelket v. Ben.
nett 27 may be followed. He recommends that the jury be allowed to esti-
mate the net amount that the deceased would have accumulated if he had
lived out his normal life expectancy, that amount to be recovered by the
personal representative for the benefit of the estate. Since the deceased.
could not accumulate the money spent for the benefit of the widow, chil-
dren, and parents, the items recoverable under the death statute would
3z. Bit see Gannon v. Lawler, 34 Pa. D. & C. 57!, 576-577 (x939).
32. See cases cited note 7 suPh
(x . Palmer v. Phila., Baltimore & Washington I. R., 218 Pa. zi4, 66 Ai. i2 7
34. 36 F. Supp. z27 (M. D. Pa. ig4o).
35. At p. 72.
36. 26 A. (2d) 659 (Pa. Sup. Ct. x942).
37. zz5 F. (2d) i02, i04 (zx4o).
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theoretically not be included in the amount recovered by the personal repre-
sentative. The net accumulations would include amounts which would
have been paid to creditors and amounts which other relatives than the
widow, children and parents might reasonably expect to receive from the
deceased.. Although this measure of damages is highly speculative, it wouid
be no more difficult for a jury to estimate than the prospective earnings
due the relatives under the death statute. It seems especially feasible
when the causes of action under the death statute and under the survival
statute are joined so that the same jury decides the entire liability of the
tort-feasor, though rendering separate verdicts. Such joinder is usual,
and will doubtless be made obligatory; 5 the danger of excessive damages
through separate actions with different juries will thus be elimmated.'
If the courts follow this suggestion no one will be heard to complain that
his interests have been prejudiced, for it effectively obviates overlapping
damages besides protecting the beneficiaries of the estate."
However, the recent decision of Pe.zzu1li v. D'Ainbrosia'1 expressly
negatived the possibility of using this measure of damages and set up an-
other standard which will probably be adhered to in the future.
Tnr SOLuTIoN
The Pezzudli case laid down certain rules for estimating damages which
appear to offer a solution to the problem. Although this solution was obiier
dictum, there seems little doubt that it will be followed in later decisions.
In that case Mr. Justice Stern refused to make any distinction between the
cause of action surviving to the personal representative when the deceased
had already brought suit, and the one surviving to him when no suit had
been brought.' 2 This seems to best approximate the intent of the legisla-
ture; the contrary reasoning of the lower courts was not only erroneous in
itself but led to an undesirable result. The personal representative there-
fore recovers the same damages his decedent would have been able to re-
cover had he lived, namely, "... for pain and suffering and for the present
worth of his loss of earnings during his life expectancy... .""
The problem of overlapping damages was solved by a simple expedient.
When the total amount that could have been recovered by decedent, and,
hence, that can now be recovered by his personal representative, has been
ascertained, the amount that is due the relatives under the death statute is
simply deducted and given to them. The possibility of duplicate damages'
is avoided by the ruling that that there should be compulsory joinder of
these causes of action."
This decision has laid down practical. workable rules for measuring
damages under the survival statute. Clarification by the legislature is still
desirable, but meanwhile the courts are able to mete out justice without
becoming involved in a dilemma of statutory interpretation.
38. Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia. 26 A. (;.d) 659, 662 (Pa. Sup. Ct. i942). Mr. Justice
Stern stated that "An appropriate rule of civil procedure to that end will be duly pro-
mulgated."
39. Problems of joinder and related procedural points are thoroughly discussed in
GooDaicii-A.jar., PROCEDURAL RULES SERVICE (1940) 51-67.
4o. This suggestion was apparently taken from a Rhode Island decision. .fcCabe
v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I. 427, 59 Ati. 112 (1904).
41. 26 A. (2d) 659, 662 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1942).
42. See note 23 mipra.
43. Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia. 26 A. (2d) 6:9, 662 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1942). Where de-
cedent is a minor, as here, his life expectancy is measured from his 21st birthday.
44. This possibility was suggested by GoovRicn-A.tRm&., PRtCE1 DRAL RUI.ES
SERVIcE (194o) §2201-39.
